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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament
where the agents’ effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately
observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents’ effort incentive through the
use of a feedback policy, which transforms his private information into a public announce-
ment. The optimal feedback policy is one that maximizes the agents’ expected effort.
The paper identifies when the principal should use the no-feedback policy that reveals no
information, or the full-feedback policy that reveals all his information.
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1. Introduction
As a prominent form of relative performance evaluation, tournaments have attracted
considerable attention in economic theory. The main focus of the theory is on the size and
allocation of rewards that would maximize the performance of the competing agents, and
on the comparison of the relative incentive schemes against more general forms of con-
tracts. Beginning with the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), a partial list of the
literature on this subject includes Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983),
Glazer and Hassin (1988), Gradstein and Konrad (1999), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), and
others. In most models, a tournament is described as a static mechanism in which the
agents’ one-time effort decision determines their performance and hence the winner. In
reality, however, many tournaments are more appropriately described as dynamic games:
Agents make sequential effort decisions in multiple stages and the winner is determined by
their overall performance. When a tournament is designed as a dynamic mechanism, one
important issue arises concerning the control of information during the course of play. In
other words, the design of a dynamic tournament should include strategic considerations
on how information is revealed to the competing agents. In general, the timing and content
of such information feedback should have a significant impact on the agents’ effort incen-
tive. Consider, for example, a tournament for job promotion within a firm. First, such a
tournament is dynamic in nature and spans multiple stages. Second, workers’ performance,
which is typically measured by the combination of such factors as leadership, originality,
ability to work in teams, etc., is often subjective and considered private information of his
boss or the firm’s personnel division. Research on performance management well recog-
nizes that the effective inducement of the work incentive requires careful designing of a
scheme through which such performance information is fed back to the worker.1
In this paper, we formulate a model of a dynamic tournament in which the principal
receives private information about agents’ performance, and then reveals as a feedback
some or all of his information to the agents. The analysis is dual to that in the standard
contest literature in that we fix prizes and focus exclusively on the effects of information.
While strategic transmission of private information is a much studied subject in economic
theory, no general understanding exists about how a mechanism should incorporate the
use of the designer’s private information. Existing theories provide varying intuitions as
follows.
1See, for example, Williams (1998).
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In auction theory, the so-called linkage principle by Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
asserts that under the affiliated distribution of signals, the seller’s expected revenue is the
highest when he is committed to revealing all of his private information to the bidders.2 In
a related framework, Milgrom (1981) shows that the seller of a good maximizes his payoff
by revealing all his private information to the buyer if it is affiliated with the quality
of his good. In some other situations, however, it is shown that the intuition furnished
by the linkage principle fails to hold: Kaplan and Zamir (2000) analyze the problem of
an auctioneer privately informed about bidders’ valuations. In an independent private
values framework, they find that the auctioneer is better off revealing the maximum of the
valuations than fully revealing his information. In a model of twice-repeated common-value
auctions with affiliated signals, de-Frutos and Rosenthal (1998) show that the auctioneer’s
expected revenue (over two auctions) is lower when information about stage 1 bids is made
public than when it is not.3
The literature on dynamic models of a race also provides a closely related observation
in the discussion of the closed- and open-loop formats.4 The open-loop format reveals no
information to the players during a competition, whereas the closed-loop format reveals
one another’s move publicly and instantaneously. It is often argued that the players tend
to slack off in the closed-loop format since, when one player has a small lead over the
others, the followers cannot catch up (in expected terms) with the leader by making the
same level of effort as him. In some circumstances, players stop making effort as soon as
a small lead is established.5
It is important to understand that information feedback has two separate effects on
the agents’ incentives. First, the revealed information influences the agents’ incentives
by changing their beliefs. This is true irrespective of whether the principal’s private in-
formation is given exogenously as in the case of the linkage principle, or is generated
endogenously by the agents’ own actions as in our model. We call this the ex post effect of
information feedback. On the other hand, when the private information is generated en-
dogenously, each agent will choose their actions strategically so as to influence the content
2A probability distribution is affiliated if the joint density function is log-supermodular.
3Perry and Reny (1999) report the failure of the linkage principle in a multi-object auction
based on an entirely different logic.
4See, for example, Harris and Vickers (1985), and Fudenberg et al. (1983). Radner (1985)
also makes a related observation in the context of a repeated principal-agent game.
5Such a phenomenon is referred to as ²-preemption in Fudenberg et al. (1983).
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of the revealed information. For example, agents may exert extra effort in early stages
to take the leading position and discourage opponents. We call this the strategic effect of
information feedback. One interpretation of the finding of de-Frutos and Rosenthal (1998)
is that these two effects may offset each other.
In our model of a multi-stage tournament, agents’ performance in each stage is stochas-
tically related to their effort in that stage. The principal privately observes their perfor-
mance realization after each stage, and reveals some or all of his private information to
the agents before the next stage. The principal’s feedback policy transforms the raw ob-
servation of the agents’ performance into a public announcement. In our terminology, the
closed-loop and open-loop formats described above correspond to the full-feedback and
no-feedback policies, respectively.6 The principal is free to choose any feedback policy and
publicly announces its use before the tournament. For example, he may use a hybrid policy
that reveals full information for some signal realizations but no information for others.7
We assume that the principal is committed to his feedback policy for any realization of the
private signal. The optimal feedback policy is one that maximizes the principal’s payoff
which is an increasing function of the agents’ efforts. As discussed below, we find that
whether he should reveal more information or not depends critically on the functional
form of the agents’ disutility of effort.
A more detailed description of our model is as follows: Two agents compete in a
tournament over T stages. The agent with the higher performance at the end of stage T
wins and is awarded a prize of a fixed value such as a promotion to a higher job rank. In
each stage t, two agents each choose an effort level at, which is observed by neither the
principal nor the opponent. The agents’ cost function of effort is time-separable and can be
expressed as the sum of stage-cost functions, which are assumed to be all strictly convex.
The score in stage t is the difference between the performance levels of the two agents and
equals the sum of the difference between their effort levels and a random noise term. The
principal privately observes the score, and makes a public announcement about it at the
end of stage t. Conditional on the announcement, the agents update their inference about
the score and decide on their effort levels in subsequent stages. We study how the choice
of a feedback policy affects the agents’ effort levels in a pure perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) of this dynamic game.
6Alternatively, the no-feedback policy can be interpreted as the simultaneous implemen-
tation of multiple one-shot tournaments.
7Under such a policy, of course, “no announcement” also has an informational content.
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The main differences between the present model and the models of auctions and
dynamic races mentioned above are as follows. First, effort is a continuous variable chosen
from the set of real numbers. This in particular implies that an agent can make high effort
in any single stage and leapfrog his opponent. This possibility is often precluded in models
of a race. Second, agents are symmetric in ability and performance is a noisy outcome of
effort. This is in contrast to the incomplete information approach in the auction literature
where the agents’ performance level (bid) is a deterministic function of their private type
(value or signal).8
The paper presents sufficient conditions for the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium and derives effort levels on the equilibrium path. It then proceeds to characterize the
optimal feedback policy. In short, revealing more information is better for the principal
when the marginal cost of effort is concave, and the converse is true when the marginal
cost is convex. More specifically, the following observations are made for the basic model
with two stages (T = 2): When the stage 2 marginal cost function of effort is convex, the
no-feedback policy is optimal in the class of feedback policies that admit a symmetric PBE.
On the other hand, the full-feedback policy is optimal in the same class when the marginal
cost function is concave. Under a stronger condition on the distribution of the noise, the
optimality of the no-feedback and full-feedback policies in the respective cases is extended
for a possibly asymmetric PBE. The similar conclusion holds for a symmetric PBE of a
general T -stage tournament. When the marginal cost of effort is convex in each stage, the
no-feedback policy is optimal. When it is concave, on the other hand, the optimal policy
is one that reveals the most information within the class of feedback policies that admit a
symmetric PBE.9
The intuition for the above results for the two-stage model is as follows: As is stan-
dard, the agents’ effort choice in each stage is such that its marginal disutility is balanced
by the marginal increment in the probability of winning. It can be readily verified that
the marginal increment in the probability of winning from stage 2 effort equals the condi-
tional expectation of a function of the stage 1 score given the public announcement. Note
in particular that the principal’s feedback policy determines the coarseness of the condi-
8In this case, the main emphasis would be on strategic signaling of the private type through
the revealed information.
9The full-feedback policy does not admit a symmetric equilibrium when T ≥ 3. How-
ever, there exists a policy admitting a symmetric PBE that reveals effectively as much
information as the full-feedback policy.
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tioning filtration. As for the stage 2 effort, its expected value equals the (unconditional)
expectation of the above conditional expectation inverted by the stage 2 marginal cost
function. When (the inverse of) the stage 2 marginal cost function is convex or concave,
therefore, Jensen’s inequality yields an ordering over various feedback policies according
to the expected effort they induce. As for the stage 1 effort, on the other hand, it can be
seen that its marginal disutility in equilibrium equals the expected marginal disutility from
stage 2 effort.10 In other words, the marginal disutility of stage 1 effort is set equal to the
unconditional expectation of the above function of the stage 1 score, which is independent
of the feedback policy by the law of iterated expectation. Therefore, the stage 1 effort is
constant under any feedback policy. Combination of these observations leads to the desired
conclusion.
As seen from the above discussion, the optimal feedback policy often takes a simple
but extreme form. What is important to note is the sensitivity of the optimal solution to
the specification of the parameters of the model. For example, revealing no information is
optimal in some cases, but is least desirable in others. Such sensitivity may in part explain
the variations in the intuitions obtained from the existing models of information revelation
as discussed above. On the other hand, it is also interesting to note that information
feedback does not matter under the common assumption of quadratic cost functions, or
equivalently, linear marginal cost functions. In this case, not only are the no-feedback
and full-feedback policies optimal, but also any feedback policy induces the same expected
effort.
In line with the standard assumption of the mechanism design literature, we assume
that the principal is publicly committed to his feedback policy for any realization of the
performance score.11 The conclusion would be very different without such commitment as
a feedback policy must then be chosen subject to the sequential rationality requirement.12
We also assume that the principal’s announcement is public. In some applications, it may
be more appropriate to suppose that he can send a private message to each agent. Mares
and Harstad (2002) show in their common-value auction model that an auctioneer may
10Although intuitive, this cannot be assumed a priori because of the strategic effect of
stage 1 effort mentioned above. For example, agents may choose to exert larger effort in
stage 1 in order to preempt the leading position.
11For example, an auctioneer does not sell his good below the reserve price even if no bid
exceeds it.
12For example, Kaplan and Zamir (2000) find that the auctioneer without a commitment
power cannot exploit his private information.
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be better off revealing his private information in a non-public way. Such might as well be
the case in the present model. However, the analysis of private feedback of information is
difficult as it induces a fundamental asymmetry in the agents’ effort choice. This is left as
a future exercise.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we develop the basic framework
for the two-stage model. Section 3 characterizes a PBE and provides sufficient conditions
for its existence. In Section 4, the analysis of the optimal feedback policy is given. An
extension to the general T -stage model is presented in Section 5.
2. Model of a Tournament
Two risk neutral agents i = 1, 2 compete in two stages. In each stage, the agents’
effort gives rise to a stochastic “score,” which indicates their relative performance. At
the end of stage 2, the principal aggregates the scores from both stages to determine the
winner.13
Formally, suppose that agent i’s effort ait in stage t is chosen from the set R+ of
non-negative real numbers. The stage t score xt is a random variable whose distribution
depends on the effort levels a1t and a2t of both agents in stage t. More specifically, we
assume that xt = a
1
t − a2t + ζt for a real-valued random variable ζt. In other words,
the score xt represents agent 1’s lead over agent 2, and is stochastically related to the
difference between their effort levels. Let φt be the density of ζt over R, and denote by Φt
the corresponding cumulative distribution. We assume that φt is strictly positive and twice
continuously differentiable, and symmetric around zero in the sense that φt(x) = φt(−x)
for any x ∈ R. We also assume that ζ1 and ζ2 are independent. Note that the density of
xt under the action profile at = (a
1
t , a
2
t ) is given by
φt(xt − a1t + a2t ).
The (aggregate) score x is the sum of scores in stages 1 and 2: x = x1 + x2. Agent 1
wins if x > 0, and agent 2 wins if x < 0. Each agent wins with equal probability in the
(probability zero) event of a tie x = 0.
Each agent derives one unit of positive utility from the winning prize (e.g., promotion
to a higher job rank), and incurs disutility from effort. The cost of effort in stage t is
13While this is a special case of the more general model discussed in Section 5, the two-stage
setting allows for a clearer prensetation and more permissive conditions.
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described by a twice differentiable cost function ct : R+ → R+. Accordingly, agent
i’s overall utility equals 1 −
P2
t=1 ct(a
i
t) if he wins, and −
P2
t=1 ct(a
i
t) otherwise. The
principal’s payoff, on the other hand, is a function of each agent’s effort levels in the
two stages: V (a11, a
2
1, a
1
2, a
2
2). The function V : R
4
+ → R is assumed to be increasing
(V (aˆ) ≥ V (a) if aˆit ≥ ait for each t, i = 1, 2) and symmetric with respect to the agents
(V (aˆ) = V (a) if aˆ1t = a
2
t and aˆ
2
t = a
1
t for t = 1, 2). Note that the principal’s payoff may
in general contain more information than his private signal x about the agents’ efforts.
In line with our assumption that the winner is determined based only on x, we suppose
that the principal observes his payoff only after the winner has been determined. Each
agent’s effort ait is his private information and observed by neither the principal nor the
other agent. On the other hand, the principal privately observes the score xt in each stage
t and can credibly reveal either whole or part of his private information x1 after stage 1.
Specifically, suppose that the principal makes a public announcement y about x1 at the
end of stage 1. Let Y be the set of possible announcements. A feedback policy (or simply a
policy) is a measurable mapping f : R→ Y , which chooses the announcement y = f(x1)
as a function of the score x1. The announcement y is credible in the sense that the principal
publicly announces f at the beginning and is committed to it for any realization of x1. The
principal chooses a feedback policy so as to maximize his expected payoff. For simplicity,
our analysis will be restricted to deterministic feedback policies. The paper’s conclusions
do not change with the introduction of a stochastic feedback policy, which chooses the
announcement y as a function of x1 and some (exogenous) random variable.
Little restriction is placed on the nature of the public announcement y. For example,
each announcement y ∈ Y may simply contain the name of the leader, or it may be an
interval in R which indicates the range of x1. Without loss of generality, we assume that
f is a surjection by choosing Y = {f(x1) : x1 ∈ R}.
As mentioned in the Introduction, some simple feedback policies will play an import
role in our analysis. In particular, the no-feedback policy sends the same message regardless
of x1, and the full-feedback policy reveals x1 completely. Given any announcement y ∈ Y ,
let f−1(y) = {x1 ∈ R : f(x1) = y} denote the inverse image of {y} under f . The feedback
policy f is regular if for any y ∈ Y , f−1(y) ⊂ R either has positive (Lebesgue) measure, or
is countable. Most “natural” policies, including the full-feedback and no-feedback policies,
are regular.14 In what follows, we will restrict attention to regular feedback policies.
14Feedback policy f fails to be regular if f−1(y) is, for example, the Cantor set for some
7
Given any policy f , agent i’s history hi after stage 1 is the information available
to agent i at the end of stage 1: hi consists of his own effort choice ai1, and the public
announcement y by the principal. Agent i’s (pure) strategy σi is a pair (σi1,σi2), where
σi1 ∈ R+ is the effort choice for stage 1, and σi2 : R+×Y → R+ is a mapping that specifies
the stage 2 effort after each possible history hi = (ai1, y). Given the starategy profile σ, let
πi2(ai2 | σ, hi1) denote agent i’s expected payoff in stage 2 when he chooses ai2 in stage 2,
his history in stage 1 is hi1, and agent j plays according to the strategy σj in both stages.
Likewise, let πi1(ai1 | σ) denote agent i’s expected payoff in stages 1 and 2 when he chooses
ai1 in stage 1 and plays according to σi2 in stage 2, and agent j plays according to σj in both
stages. In view of the fact that the distribution φ1 has full support, we define a strategy
profile σ = (σ1,σ2) to be a (pure) perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if for i = 1, 2,
πi1(σi1 | σ) ≥ πi1(ai1 | σ) for any ai1 ∈ R+, and
πi2(σi2(hi1) | σ, hi1) ≥ πi2(ai2 | σ, hi1) for any ai2 ∈ R+ and hi1 ∈ R+ × Y .
3. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
We assume that the marginal cost of effort in each stage is increasing:
Assumption 1: For t = 1, 2, the cost function ct : R+ → R+ satisfies c0t(0) = 0 and
infa∈R+ c
00
t (a) > 0.
Let a regular feedback policy f be given. We denote by gσ1 (x1 | y) the conditional
density of x1 given the stage 1 effort profile σ1 = (σ11 ,σ21) and the public announcement y.
For x1 ∈ f−1(y), it can be expressed as
gσ1 (x1 | y) =
φ1(x1 − σ11 + σ21)R
f−1(y) φ1(x01 − σ11 + σ21) dx01
or
φ1(x1 − σ11 + σ21)P
x01∈f−1(y)
φ1(x01 − σ11 + σ21)
depending on whether f−1(y) has positive measure or is countable.15 Recall that the
convolution of φ1 and φ2, denoted φ1 ∗ φ2, is defined by
(φ1 ∗ φ2)(x) =
Z
R
φ1(x− u)φ2(u) du.
For any strategy profile σ, let σi2,0(y) = σi2(σi1, y) for y ∈ Y . In other words, σi2,0(y) is
agent i’s stage 2 effort along the path of play. The following theorem characterizes the
effort level chosen in any pure PBE.
y.
15Note that gσ1 depends only on the stage 1 profile σ1 and not on the stage 2 profile σ2.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that supx∈R |φ02(x)| < infa∈R+ c002(a).
If σ is a pure PBE under any feedback policy f , then for any y ∈ Y ,
(1) σ12,0(y) = σ22,0(y) = α2(σ1, y) ≡ (c02)−1
³
Eσ[φ2(x˜1) | y]
´
.
If, in addition, σ11, σ21 > 0, then
(2)



c01(σ11) = (φ1 ∗ φ2)(σ11 − σ21) +
Z
R
c2
¡
α2(σ1, f(x1))
¢
φ01(x1 − σ11 + σ21) dx1,
c01(σ21) = (φ1 ∗ φ2)(σ11 − σ21)−
Z
R
c2
¡
α2(σ1, f(x1))
¢
φ01(x1 − σ11 + σ21) dx1.
Proof: See the Appendix. //
It should be noted that in any PBE, the agents’ stage 2 efforts are symmetric for any
realization of the public announcement whether the stage 1 efforts are symmetric or not.
It should be noted that the stage 2 effort is determined through the standard marginal
consideration: It balances the increment in the probability of winning and the cost of
one additional unit of effort. (1) has the following implication. Suppose for simplicity
that f is the full-feedback policy: f(x1) = x1. In this case, σi2,0(x1) = (c02)−1
¡
φ2(x1)
¢
as is readily verified. It follows that the agents make the highest stage 2 effort when
x1 is such that φ2(x1) is the largest. When φ2 is a unimodal distribution such as the
normal distribution, this means that the stage 2 effort is maximal when the stage 1 score
is x1 = 0 and decreases with |x1|. This supports the standard intuition that the closer the
competition, the more effort the agents exert. Note, however, that this intuition no longer
holds when, for example, φ2 is bimodel so that φ2(x) = φ2(−x) > φ2(0) for some x > 0.
The next theorem identifies a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure PBE.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. There exists ² > 0 such that if
(∗) sup
x∈R
φ2(x), sup
x∈R
|φ02(x)|,
Z
R
|φ001(x)| dx, and
Z
R
φ01(x)2
φ1(x)
dx < ²,
then given any feedback policy f , there exists a pure PBE under f if (2) has a solution
σ1 = (σ11, σ21) ≥ 0.
Proof: See the Appendix. //
The conditions involving φt in Theorems 1 and 2 all indicate that the performance
score is a noisy signal of agents’ effort. If, for example, ζt has the normal distribution
9
N(0, σ2t ) (t = 1, 2), then these conditions hold whenever the variances σ21 and σ22 are
sufficiently large: In fact, note that supx∈R φ2(x) = 1√2πσ2 , supx∈R |φ
0
2(x)| = 1√2π σ22 e
−1/2,
Z
R
|φ001(x)| dx =
1√
2πσ1
Z
R
¯¯¯
− 1σ21
e−x
2/2σ21 +
x2
σ41
e−x
2/2σ21
¯¯¯
dx ≤ 2σ21
,
and Z
R
φ01(x)2
φ1(x)
dx =
1
σ21
.
It should be noted that high noise is a standard requirement for the existence of an equi-
librium in a tournament model where performance is stochastically related to effort.16
Intuitively, if the noise is too small, then any infinitesimal increase in effort results in
almost sure winning, making it impossible for the marginal equation to hold.
It should also be emphasized that in Theorem 2, the noise level required for the
existence of an equilibrium is independent of a particular feedback policy f .
In what follows, we assume for simplicity that Y is a vector space and normalize
f(0) = 0 ∈ Y . With this standardization, we say that a feedback policy f is odd if
f(x) = −f(−x) for any x ∈ R and even if f(x) = f(−x) for any x ∈ R. Intuitively, if f is
odd, then the inference drawn from the announcement when agent i leads agent j in stage
1 is the exact opposite of that when their positions are reversed. On the other hand, if f
is even, then the announcement is the same regardless of the identity of the leader as long
as the size of the lead is the same. For example, the full-feedback policy f(x) = x is odd
(but not even), whereas the no-feedback policy f(x) ≡ 0 is the only policy that is both
odd and even.
We say that a strategy profile σ is symmetric if the two agents always choose the same
effort level on the path: σ11 = σ21 and σ12,0(y) = σ22,0(y) for any y ∈ Y . We now show that
every even or odd policy admits a symmetric PBE. By summing the two equations of (2),
we see that the only solution to (2) (if any) compatible with σ11 = σ21 is
(3) σ11 = σ21 = a∗1 ≡ (c01)−1((φ1 ∗ φ2)(0)).
The following theorem shows that this indeed corresponds to an equilibrium when f is
either odd or even.
16See, for example, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
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Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that (*) holds for a sufficiently small
² > 0. If f is either odd or even, then there exists a unique symmetric pure PBE σ.
Furthermore, for α2 defined in (1) and a∗1 defined in (3), σ satisfies
σ11 = σ21 = a∗1,
and
σ12,0(y) = σ22,0(y) = α2(σ1, y) for any y ∈ Y .
Proof: See the Appendix. //
It should be noted that the stage 1 effort a∗1 in the symmetric pure PBE is independent
of the feedback policy f . Furthermore, the expected marginal cost in stage 2 equals the
marginal cost in stage 1 since
Eσ
£
c02(α2(σ1, y˜))
¤
= Eσ
h
Eσ
£
φ2(x˜1) | y˜
¤i
= Eσ[φ2(x˜1)]
= (φ1 ∗ φ2)(0)
= c01(a
∗
1)
by the law of iterated expectation. The following facts about the no-feedback and full-
feedback policies are immediate consequences of the above theorem.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. If σ is the (unique) symmetric pure
PBE under the no-feedback policy, then σ11 = σ21 = a∗1 and
σ12,0(y) = σ22,0(y) = a∗2 ≡ (c02)−1
¡
(φ1 ∗ φ2)(0)
¢
for any y ∈ Y .
Likewise, if σ is the (unique) symmetric pure PBE under the full-feedback policy, then
σ11 = σ21 = a∗1 and
Eσ[σi2,0(y˜)] =
Z
R
(c02)
−1(φ2(x1))φ1(x1) dx1.
When (c02)−1 is concave or convex, Proposition 4 allows us to rank the no-feedback and
full-feedback policies in terms of the expected stage 2 effort they induce in the symmetric
PBE: When (c02)
−1 is concave, Jensen’s inequality implies thatZ
R
(c02)
−1(φ2(x1))φ1(x1) dx1 ≤ (c02)−1
³Z
R
φ2(x1)φ1(x1) dx1
´
= a∗2.
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The reverse inequality holds when (c02)
−1 is convex. The next section presents a general-
ization of these observations.
4. Optimal Feedback Policy
In this section, we will study the principal’s expected payoff in the pure PBE as
identified in Theorems 1-3. For this, we need to make the following assumption about the
principal’s payoff function:
Assumption 2: V (a1, a
1
2 = a
2
2 = u) is linear in u. In other words, for any a1 ∈ R2+, there
exist A ≥ 0 and B such that V (a1, a12 = a21 = u) = Au+B.
In view of the fact that the stage 2 efforts in any PBE are always symmetric between
the two agents by (1), Assumption 2 ensures that the principal’s expected payoff is mono-
tonically related to the expected effort in stage 2.17 The class of payoff functions V for
which Assumption 2 holds includes V (a) =
P
t (a
1
t + a
2
t ), V (a) =
P
t min {a1t , a2t}, and
more generally, the CES family V (a) =
P
t
©
(a1t )
m + (a2t )
m
ª1/m
(m ∈ R \ {0}).
Let v(σ, f) denote the principal’s expected payoff in a PBE σ under the feedback
policy f :
v(σ, f) = Eσ
h
V
³
σ1,σ2,0(y˜)
´i
.
4.1. Symmetric Equilibrium
Define
v¯∗(f) = sup
©
v(σ, f) : σ is a symmetric pure PBE under f
ª
with the convention that v¯∗(f) = −∞ if no such equilibrium exists.
Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that (*) holds for a sufficiently
small ² > 0. If the marginal cost function c02 for stage 2 is convex, then the no-feedback
policy maximizes v¯∗ among all policies.
Proof: Take any policy f with a symmetric pure PBE σ. Since (c02)−1 is concave, it
follows from Jensen’s inequality and the law of iterated expectation that the expected
17In the consideration of a symmetric PBE in Section 4.1, we only need the linearity of
V (a1, a
1
2 = a
2
2 = u) in u for a1 such that a
1
1 = a
2
1.
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stage 2 effort level in equilibrium satisfies
Eσ[α2(σ1, y˜)] = Eσ
h
(c02)
−1
³
Eσ[φ2(x˜1) | y˜]
´i
≤ (c02)−1
³
Eσ
h
Eσ[φ2(x˜1) | y˜]
i´
= (c02)
−1
³
Eσ
£
φ2(x˜1)
¤´
= (c02)
−1¡(φ1 ∗ φ2)(0)¢
= a∗2.
Assumption 2 hence implies that for some A ≥ 0 and B,
Eσ
h
V
¡
σ1, a12 = a22 = α2(σ1, y˜)
¢i
= Eσ
h
Aα2(σ1, y˜) +B
i
= AEσ
£
α2(σ1, y˜)
¤
+B
≤ Aa∗2 +B
= V (a∗1, a
∗
1, a
∗
2, a
∗
2).
The desired conclusion follows since the last term equals the principal’s expected payoff in
the symmetric PBE under the no-feedback policy. //
Theorem 5. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that (*) holds for a sufficiently
small ² > 0. If the marginal cost function c02 for stage 2 is concave, then the full-feedback
policy maximizes v¯∗ among all policies.
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 4, take any policy f which admits a symmetric PBE
σ. Since (c02)−1 is convex, Jensen’s inequality now implies that
Eσ[α2(σ1, y˜)] = Eσ
h
(c02)
−1
³
Eσ[φ2(x˜1) | y˜]
´i
≤ Eσ
h
Eσ
£
(c02)
−1¡φ2(x˜1)¢ | y˜¤i
= Eσ
£
(c02)
−1¡φ2(x˜1)¢¤.
Since σ is symmetric, σ11 = σ21 = a∗1 by (2), and hence the far right-hand side of the above
inequality equals
a∗∗2 =
Z
R
(c02)
−1(φ2(x1))φ1(x1) dx1,
which is the expected stage 2 effort in the symmetric PBE under the full-feedback policy.
It therefore follows from Assumption 2 that for some A ≥ 0 and B,
Eσ
h
V
¡
σ1, a12 = a22 = α2(σ1, y˜)
¢i
= Eσ
h
Aα2(σ1, y˜) +B
i
= AEσ
£
α2(σ1, y˜)
¤
+B
≤ Aa∗∗2 +B.
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Since the last term equals the principal’s expected payoff in the symmetric PBE under the
full-feedback policy, the desired conclusion follows. //
The proofs of Theorems 4 and 5 also show that when c02 is concave (resp. convex), the
no-feedback (resp. full-feedback) policy yields the lowest expected payoff to the principal.
On the other hand, when the marginal cost function c02 for stage 2 is linear (and hence
both concave and convex), the induced effort in either stage is not affected by the feedback
policy. The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 6. Suppose that the stage 2 cost function is quadratic: c2(a) =
1
2 ka
2 for
some k > 0. Suppose also that Assumption 1 holds and that supx∈R |φ02(x)| < k. If σ
is a symmetric pure PBE under any feedback policy f , then σi1 = a∗1 and Eσ[σi2,0(y˜)] =
1
k (φ1 ∗ φ2)(0). In particular, the principal’s expected payoff v(σ, f) is independent of f .
4.2. Asymmetric Equilibrium
Define now
v¯(f) = sup
©
v(σ, f) : σ is a pure PBE under f and satisfies (2)
ª
,
with v¯(f) = −∞ if the corresponding strategy profile does not exist. We will make some
additional assumptions in order to evaluate the principal’s expected payoff when the agents’
effort levels are asymmetric.
Assumption 3: (φ1 ∗ φ2)(0) = maxx∈R (φ1 ∗ φ2)(x).
Assumption 4: For any a = (a11, a
2
1, a
1
2, a
2
2) ∈ R4+ such that a11 < a21 and a12 = a22, we have
(4)
c001(a
1
1)− 2(φ1 ∗ φ2)0(a11 − a21)
c001(a
2
1) + 2(φ1 ∗ φ2)0(a11 − a21)
<
∂V
∂a11
(a)
∂V
∂a21
(a)
.
Note that the left-hand side of (4) represents the slope of the curve
(5) h(a11, a
2
1) ≡ c01(a11) + c01(a21)− 2(φ1 ∗ φ2)(a11 − a21) = 0
in the (a11, a
2
1)-plane, while the right-hand side represents that of the principal’s iso-payoff
curve. (4) is a single-crossing condition asserting that the iso-profit curve always has a
steeper slope than (5). Plainly, Assumption 4 requires that the two agents’ efforts be
complementary to each other from the point of view of the principal’s payoff. To see this,
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suppose that V has the CES form: V (a) =
P
t
©
(a1t )
m+(a2t )
m
ª1/m
(m ∈ R\ {0}). In this
case, the right-hand side of (4) equals (a11/a
2
1)
m−1. Hence, (4) is easy to satisfy when m−1
is negative and large in absolute value. In particular, it will hold for any c1 as m→ −∞,
or V (a) =
P
t min {a1t , a2t}. On the other hand, the inequality fails if m > 1 and c01 is
concave.
Assumptions 3 and 4 together guarantee that along (5), the principal’s payoff is maxi-
mized at the symmetric point (a∗1, a
∗
1) (provided that the second-stage efforts are symmet-
ric).
Lemma 7. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 hold and that lima→∞ c
0
1(a) > 2(φ1 ∗
φ2)(0) for i = 1, 2. Then for any σ1 that solves (2) and any a2 such that a12 = a22, the
principal’s payoff function satisfies
V (a∗1, a
∗
1, a2) ≥ V (σ1, a2).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 8. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold and that (**) holds for a sufficiently
small ² > 0. If the marginal cost function c02 for stage 2 is convex, then the no-feedback
policy maximizes v¯(·) among all policies.
Proof: See the Appendix. //
Assumption 5: φ2 is unimodal in the sense that φ2 is strictly increasing over (−∞, 0)
and strictly decreasing over (0,∞).
Note that Assumption 5 implies Assumption 3.
Theorem 9. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 5 hold, and that (*) holds for a
sufficiently small ² > 0. If the marginal cost function c02 for stage 2 is concave, then the
full-feedback policy maximizes v¯(·) among all policies.
Proof: See the Appendix. //
As in Section 4.1, we can show that the principal’s payoff is independent of a particular
feedback policy when the stage-cost function c2 is quadratic.
Consider now the feedback policy f that reveals the absolute value of the score:
f(x1) = |x1| for every x1. In other words, this policy reveals the exact size of the lead,
but not the identity of the leader. In the two-stage model, this policy is equivalent to the
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full-feedback policy in terms of the induced effort level. To see this, note that if f is as
defined above, then
Eσ
£
φ2(x˜1) | y˜ = f(x1)
¤
=
φ2(x1) + φ2(−x1)
2
= φ2(x1)
by the symmetry of φ2. It follows that the stage 2 effort under f equals that under the full-
feedback policy. It follows that this feedback policy is also optimal under the conditions
of Theorems 5 and 9.
5. T -Stage Tournament
Suppose now that the tournament game is played over T stages. Let ait denote agent
i’s effort in stage t. The score xt in stage t equals a1t −a2t+ζt, where ζt is a random variable
with the strictly positive density φt over R. We assume that φt is symmetric around zero,
and twice continuously differentiable. For each t = 1, . . . , T , denote by ωt = (x1, . . . , xt)
the sequence of scores in stages 1, . . . , t, and by ∆t the aggregate score at the end of stage
t:
∆t =
tX
s=1
xs.
Given ωt and s < t, we also use ωs to denote the s-length truncation of ωt.
The feedback policy f in the T -stage tournament is a sequence of (measurable) map-
pings f1, . . . , fT−1 such that
ft : R
t → Yt for t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
where Yt is the set of possible announcements after stage t. Note that the announcement
yt = ft(ωt) after stage t may in general depend on all past scores and not just the stage
t score. This reflects the fact that a feedback policy in the general T -stage model is a
significantly more complicated object than that in the two-stage model. For example, the
principal may wish to withhold some information for some stages before releasing it with
a lag conditional on some subsequent developments, etc.
We say that the feedback policy f is even if ft(ωt) = ft(−ωt) for every ωt and t.
Belonging to this class is the no-feedback policy which has ft(ωt) = ft(ω0t) for every ωt, ω0t
and t. Note that the full-feedback policy is not in this class and will be excluded from the
following analysis. We will, however, show that there exists an even feedback policy that
effectively reveals all the information in a symmetric equilibrium.
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Given any feedback policy f , let
Zt(f) = {zt = (y1, . . . , yt) : ys = fs(ωs) for s = 1, . . . , t for some ωt}
be the set of sequences of possible announcements after stages 1, . . . , t, and for each zt ∈
Zt(f), let
Xft (zt) = {ωt : fs(ωs) = ys for s = 1, . . . , t}
be the set of sequences of scores compatible with zt. In the T -period model, we say that
f is regular if Xft (zt) has positive measure or is countable for every zt and t.
In order to avoid technical complications arising from boundary problems, we assume
that efforts can take negative values.
Assumption 6: For each t = 1, . . . , T , the cost function ct in stage t is a mapping from
R to R+ and satisfies ct(0) = c
0
t(0) = 0, and infa∈R c
00
t (a) > 0.
Under Assumption 6, the cost of negative effort is positive and increases (at an in-
creasing rate) with its absolute size. As seen below, however, only positive efforts are
observed along any symmetric equilibrium path.
Agent i’s history after stage t, denoted hit, is the sequence of his effort choices
bit ≡ (ai1, . . . , ait) in stages 1, . . . , t along with the sequence of public announcements
zt = (y1, . . . , yt) after stages 1, . . . , t. Agent i’s strategy σi is a sequence (σ1, . . . ,σT ),
where σt : Rt−1 × Zt−1(f) → R specifies the effort level in stage t as a function of his
history hit−1 after stage t− 1.
Let πi1(ai1 | σ) be agent i’s expected payoff in the entire game when he chooses ai1 in
stage 1 and then plays according to σi in stages 2, . . . , T , and agent j plays according to
σj in stages 1, . . . , T . Likewise, let πit(ait | σ, hit−1) be agent i’s expected payoff over stages
t, . . . , T when he chooses ait in stage t and plays according to σi in stages t+ 1, . . . , T , his
history equals hit−1, and agent j plays according to σj . A strategy profile σ is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) under policy f if for i = 1, 2,
πi1(σi1 | σ) ≥ πi1(ai1 | σ) for every ai1 ∈ R, and
πit(σit(hit−1) | σ, hit−1) ≥ πit(ait | σ, hit−1)
for every ait ∈ R, hit−1 ∈ Rt−1 × Zt−1(f), and t = 2, . . . , T .
As before, denote by σit,0(zt−1) agent i’s effort level in stage t along the sequence of public
announcements zt−1. A PBE is symmetric if the effort levels are symmetric on the path,
i.e., σ1t,0(zt−1) = σ2t,0(zt−1) for any zt−1 ∈ Zt−1(f) and t = 1, . . . , T .
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Let gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) denote the density of ωt−1 = (x1, . . . , xt−1) conditional on the
sequence of public announcements zt−1 = (y1, . . . , yt−1), provided that both agents play
according to a symmetric strategy profile. When Xft−1(zt−1) has positive measure, it can
be written as
gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) =
Qt−1
s=1 φs(xs)R
Xf
t−1(zt−1)
Qt−1
s=1 φs(x0s) dω0t−1
if ωt−1 ∈ Xft−1(zt−1) and gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) = 0 otherwise. The similar expression applies
when Xft−1(zt−1) is countable. Note that gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) is independent of any particular
symmetric strategy profile σ.
The following theorem provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a PBE for
any even feedback policy in the T -stage model and characterizes the effort levels on the
equilibrium path.
Theorem 10. Suppose that Assumption 6 holds. Then there exists ² > 0 such that if
φT (x), |φ0T (x)| < ² for any x ∈ R, and(∗∗)
|φ0t(x)|, |φ00t (x)|,
¯¯¯φ0t(x)
φt(x)
¯¯¯
,
¯¯¯φ00t (x)
φt(x)
¯¯¯
< ² for any x ∈ R and t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
then for any even feedback policy f , (i) there exists a unique symmetric pure PBE σ =
(σ1, . . . , σT ) of the T -stage tournament, and (ii) the stage t effort on the equilibrium path
in any symmetric PBE is given by
(6) σit,0(zt−1) = (c0t)−1
µ
Eσ
h
φT (∆˜T−1)
¯¯¯
zt−1
i¶
for any zt−1 ∈ Zt−1(f) and t = 1, . . . , T .
Proof: See the Appendix. //
As is true with the two-stage model in Theorem 2, the existence of an equilibrium in
the T -stage model requires the noise level to be sufficiently high through condition (**),
and the level ² of noise can be taken independent of the particular feedback policy f . Note
that (**) for T = 2 is more restrictive than (*). For example, the normal distribution,
which is allowed under (*), is excluded by (**).18
18On the other hand, (**) allows a version of the exponential distribution f(x) = γe−γ|x|
(γ > 0).
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We can rewrite (6) more explicitly as
σit,0(zt−1) = (c0t)−1
µZ
RT−1
φT (∆T−1)
T−1Y
s=t
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
¶
when Xft−1(zt−1) has positive measure. This shows that the PBE effort level in the T -stage
model is a direct extension of that in the two-stage model.
We now study the implication of (6) on the principal’s payoff. For this, assume that
the principal’s payoff function V : R2T → R is monotone (V (aˆ) ≥ V (a) if aˆ ≥ a) and
symmetric (V (a) = V (aˆ) if a1 = aˆ2 and a2 = aˆ1). We also assume that it is monotonically
related to the expected efforts when they are symmetric between the agents:
Assumption 7: V (a11 = a
2
1 = u1, a
1
2 = a
2
2 = u2, . . . , a
1
T = a
2
T = uT ) is linear in
(u2, . . . , uT ). In other words, for any u1 ∈ R+, there exist A2, . . . , AT ∈ R+ and B ∈ R
such that V (a11 = a
2
1 = u1, a
1
2 = a
2
2 = u2, . . . , a
1
T = a
2
T = uT ) =
PT
t=2 At ut +B.
As in Section 4, let v(σ, f) = Eσ
£
V
¡
σ1,σ2,0(z˜1), . . . ,σT,0(z˜T−1)
¢¤
, and
v¯∗(f) = sup
©
v(σ, f) : σ is a symmetric PBE under f
ª
.
Theorem 11. Suppose that Assumptions 6 and 7 hold and that (**) holds for a sufficiently
small ². If c0t is convex for t = 2, . . . , T , then the no-feedback policy f maximizes v¯∗ among
all policies.
Proof: Let a∗t denote the (deterministic) stage t effort in the symmetric PBE σ under the
no-feedback policy f . Under f , we have Xft−1(zt−1) = Rt−1 so that gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) =Qt−1
s=1 φs(xs). By Theorem 10, hence
c0t(a
∗
t ) = E
σ£φT (∆˜T−1)¤ = Z
RT−1
φT (∆T−1)
T−1Y
s=1
φs(xs) dx1 · · · dxT−1
= (φ1 ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(0),
where φ1 ∗ · · · ∗φT denotes the convolution of φ1, . . . ,φT . It follows that a∗t = (c0t)−1((φ1 ∗
· · · ∗ φT )(0)). Now let σ0 be a symmetric PBE under any feedback policy f 0. Denote
y0t = f
0
t(ωt) and z0t = (y01, . . . , y0t). Since (c0t)−1 is concave, Jensen’s inequality implies that
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agent i’s stage t effort under (σ0)i satisfies
Eσ
0h
(σ0)it(z0t−1)
i
= Eσ
0
·
(c0t)
−1
³
Eσ
0h
φT (∆˜T−1)
¯¯¯
z˜0t−1
i´¸
≤ (c0t)−1
µ
Eσ
0h
Eσ
0£
φT (∆˜T−1) | z˜0t−1
¤i¶
= (c0t)
−1
³
Eσ
0£
φT (∆˜T−1)
¤´
= (c0t)
−1¡(φ1 ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(0)¢ = a∗t .
This completes the proof. //
When c0t is concave, we expect the optimal policy to be the one that reveals the most
information. As mentioned earlier, however, the full-feedback policy does not admit a
symmetric PBE when T ≥ 3. We instead consider the even policy f that reveals the
absolute value of the aggregate score at the end of each stage:
(7) ft(ωt) = |∆t| t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Note that the discussion at the end of Section 4 shows that such a policy induces the same
effort level as the full-feedback policy in the two-stage model. The next theorem shows
that f given in (7) is indeed optimal.
Theorem 12. Suppose that Assumptions 6 and 7 hold and that (**) holds for a sufficiently
small ² > 0. If c0t is concave for t = 2, . . . , T , then the feedback policy f in (7) that reveals
the absolute value of the aggregate score after every stage maximizes v¯∗ among all policies.
Proof: See the Appendix. //
Appendix
When the distinction is necessary, equations in the Appendix assume for simplicity
that the set of compatible scores f−1(y) or Xft−1(zt−1) has positive measure. When it is
countable, any integral with respect to the conditional density should be replaced by the
summation over f−1(y) or Xft−1(zt−1).
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix any PBE σ. With slight abuse of notation, let gσ1 (x1 | ai1, y)
denote the density of x1 conditional on the public announcement y when the stage 1 actions
are ai1 for agent i and σ
j
1 for agent j: For example, when f
−1(y) has positive measure, we
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have for x1 ∈ f−1(y),
gσ1 (x1 | a11, y) =
φ1(x1 − a11 + σ21)R
f−1(y) φ1(x01 − a11 + σ21) dx01
, and
gσ1 (x1 | a21, y) =
φ1(x1 − σ11 + a21)R
f−1(y)
φ1(x01 − σ11 + a21) dx01
.
Note in particular that gσ1 (x1 | σ11, y) = gσ1 (x1 | σ21 , y) = gσ1 (x1 | y). Recall that πi2(ai2 |
σ, ai1, y) represents agent i’s expected payoff in stage 2 when he chooses ai2 in stage 2, his
history after stage 1 is hi1 = (ai1, y), and agent j plays according to the equilibrium strategy
σj. For simplicity, write πi2(ai2 | ai1, y) for πi2(ai2 | σ, ai1, y). It can be seen that πi2(ai2 | aii, y)
is written as
(a1) π12(a12 | a11, y) =
Z
R
Φ2(a12 − σ22,0(y) + x1) gσ1 (x1 | a11, y) dx1 − c2(a12)
for agent 1, and
π22(a22 | a21, y) =
Z
R
Φ2(−σ12,0(y) + a22 − x1) gσ1 (x1 | a21, y) dx1 − c2(a22)
for agent 2. Differentiating π12 with respect to a12, we obtain
(a2)
∂π12
∂a12
(a12 | a11, y) =
Z
R
φ2(a12 − σ22,0(y) + x1) gσ1 (x1 | a11, y) dx1 − c02(a12).
Since c02(0) = 0 implies
∂π12
∂a12
(0 | a11, y) > 0, the equilibrium action σ12(a11, y) (if any) must
satisfy
∂π12
∂a12
(σ12(a11, y) | a11, y) = 0,
or equivalently,
(a3) c02
¡
σ12(a11, y)
¢
=
Z
R
φ2(σ12(a11, y)− σ22,0(y) + x˜1) gσ1 (x1 | a11, y) dx1
for every a11. By our assumption that infa∈R+ c
00
2(a) > supx∈R |φ02(x)|, we have ∂
2π12
∂(a12)
2 (a12 |
a11, y) < 0, which shows that σ12(·, y) is differentiable as a function of a11 by the implicit
function theorem. For agent 2, we have
(a4) c02
¡
σ22(a21, y)
¢
=
Z
R
φ2(−σ12,0(y) + σ22(a21, y)− x˜1) gσ1 (x1 | a21, y) dx1
21
for every a21. Noting σi2(σi1, y) = σi2,0(y) and gσ1 (x1 | σi1, y) = gσ1 (x1 | y), we substitute
ai1 = σi1 (i = 1, 2) into (a3) and (a4) to obtain
(a5) σ12,0(y) = σ22,0(y) = α2(y) ≡ (c02)−1
³
Eσ
£
φ2(x˜1) | y
¤´
.
Now let πi1(ai1) = πi1(ai1 | σ) be agent i’s (overall) expected payoff when he takes ai1 in
stage 1 and σi2(ai1, y) in stage 2, while agent j plays according to his equilibrium strategy
σj. For i = 1, we have
π11(a11) = −c1(a11)(a6)
+
Z
R
n
Φ2(σ12(a11, f(x1))− σ22,0(f(x1)) + x1)− c2(σ12(a11, f(x1)))
o
× φ1(x1 − a11 + σ21) dx1.
In view of the differentiability of σ12 in a11 noted above, we can differentiate π11 using the
envelope theorem to obtain
(π11)0(a11) = −
Z
R
Φ2
³
σ12(a11, f(x1))− σ22,0(f(x1)) + x1
´
φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21) dx1(a7)
+
Z
R
c2(σ12(a11, f(x1)))φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21) dx1 − c01(a11).
If the equilibrium stage 1 action a11 = σ11 is strictly positive, the FOC (π11)0(σ11) = 0 must
hold. Since σ12,0(y) = σ22,0(y) for any y ∈ Y by (a5), this FOC is equivalent to
c01(σ11) = −
Z
R
Φ2(x1)φ01(x1 − σ11 + σ21) dx1 +
Z
R
c2
¡
α2(σ1, f(x1))
¢
φ01(x1 − σ11 + σ21) dx1.
Changing variables of the first integral, and then integrating it by parts, we see that this
is equivalent to the first line of (2). The symmetric argument shows that the second line
of (2) is equivalent to the FOC for agent 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: Choose ² > 0 such that ² < κ/2, where
κ = min
©
1, inf
a∈R+
c001(a), inf
a∈R+
c002(a), lima→∞ c
0
2(a)
ª
.
Suppose that σ1 = (σ11,σ21) solves (2) and consider the equations
ϕ12(a12 | a11, y) ≡
Z
R
φ2(a12 − α2(σ1, y) + x1) gσ1 (x1 | a11, y) dx1 − c02(a12) = 0, and
ϕ22(a22 | a21, y) ≡
Z
R
φ2(α2(σ1, y)− a22 + x1) gσ1 (x1 | a21, y) dx1 − c02(a22) = 0,
22
for each a11, a
2
1 ∈ R, and y ∈ Y . We have ϕ12(0 | a11, y) > 0 by c02(0) = 0 and φ2 > 0,
and ϕ12(a12 | a11, y) < 0 for a12 large enough since lima→∞ c02(a) > ² > supx∈R φ2(x).
Furthermore, it follows from infa∈R c
00
2(a) > ² > supx∈R |φ02(x)| that
∂ϕ12
∂a12
(a12 | a11, y) = −c002(a12) +
Z
R
φ02(a12 − σ22,0(y) + x1) gσ1 (x1 | a11, y) dx1 < 0.
Hence, there exists a unique solution to ϕ12(a12 | a11, y) = 0, and we define a12 = σ12(a11, y) > 0
to be this solution. In the same manner, σ22(a21 | a21, y) is defined to be the unique solution
to ϕ22(a22 | a21, y) = 0. Note now that when a11 = σ11 and a21 = σ21, σ12(σ11, y) = σ22(σ21, y) =
α2(σ1, y) solves the two equations. This implies that ϕ12(a12 | a11, y) = 0 is equivalent to
the FOC
∂π12
∂a12
(a12 | a11, y) = 0 ((a3) in the proof of Theorem 1) of agent i’s stage 2 payoff
maximization problem. To see that it does maximize his payoff, it suffices to note that
∂2π12
∂(a12)
2 (a
1
2 | a11, y) = −c002(a12) +
Z
R
φ02(a12 − σ22,0(y) + x1) gσ1 (x1 | a11, y) dx1
< −κ+ ² < 0.
The same observation holds for agent 2. As in the proof of Theorem 1, denote by πi1(ai1)
agent i’s overall payoff when he takes action ai1 in stage 1 and chooses σi2(ai1, y) in stage
2, and agent j takes action σj1 in stage 1 and chooses σ
j
2(σ
j
1, y) in stage 2. Define
ϕ11(a11) = −c01(a11) + (φ1 ∗ φ2)(a11 − σ21) +
Z
R
c2
¡
α2(a11, σ21, f(x1))
¢
φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21) dx1,
ϕ21(a21) = −c01(a21) + (φ1 ∗ φ2)(σ11 − a21)−
Z
R
c2
¡
α2(σ11, a21, f(x1))
¢
φ01(x1 − σ11 + a21) dx1.
By assumption, ai1 = σi1 solves ϕi1(ai1) = 0. Furthermore, ϕi1(ai1) = (πi1)0(ai1) as seen in the
proof of Theorem 1 so that σi1 is a solution to the FOC of agent i’s payoff maximization
problem. In what follows, We will show (ϕi1)0 = (πi1)00 < 0 and hence σi1 is indeed the
maximizer of π11.
Since σ12 is differentiable with respect to a11, we can differentiate (a7) to obtain
(ϕ11)0(a11) = −c001(a11)
−
Z
R
n
φ2
¡
σ12(a11, f(x1))− σ22,0(f(x1)) + x1
¢
− c02(σ12(a11, f(x1)))
o
× ∂σ
1
2
∂a11
(a11, f(x1))φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21) dx1
+
Z
R
n
Φ2
¡
σ12(a11, f(x1))− σ22,0(f(x1)) + x1
¢
− c2(σ12(a11, f(x1)))
o
φ001(x1 − a11 + σ21) dx1.
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We have c02(σ12) ≤ ² by (a4) and c2(σ12) ≤ 1 by the above observation that σ12 maximizes
π12. Hence, ¯¯
φ2(σ12 − σ22,0 + x1)− c02(σ12)
¯¯
≤ ²,
and ¯¯
Φ2(σ12 − σ22,0 + x1)− c2(σ12)
¯¯
≤ 1.
It follows that
(ϕ11)0(a11) ≤ −c001(a11) + ²
Z
R
¯¯¯¯
∂σ12
∂a11
(a11, f(x1))
¯¯¯¯ ¯¯
φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21)
¯¯
dx1(a8)
+
Z
R
¯¯
φ001(x1 − a11 + σ21)
¯¯
dx1.
Now take y ∈ Y such that f−1(y) has positive measure. Then for x1 ∈ f−1(y),
∂gσ1
∂a11
(x1 | a11, y) =
−φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21)R
f−1(y) φ1(xˆ1 − a11 + σ21) dxˆ1
+
φ1(x1 − a11 + σ21)
R
f−1(y) φ
0
1(xˆ1 − a11 + σ21) dxˆ1©R
f−1(y)
φ1(xˆ1 − a11 + σ21) dxˆ1
ª2 ,
and hence
Z
R
¯¯¯∂gσ1
∂a11
(x1 | a11, y)
¯¯¯
dx1 ≤ 2
R
f−1(y)
|φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21)| dx1R
f−1(y)
φ1(x1 − a11 + σ21) dx1
= 2E[q(x1) | a11,σ21, y],
where
q(x1) =
¯¯
φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21)
¯¯
φ1(x1 − a11 + σ21)
.
On the other hand,
∂ϕ12
∂a11
(a12 | a11, y) =
Z
R
φ2
¡
σ12 − σ22,0 + x1
¢ ∂gσ1
∂a11
(x1 | a11, y) dx1,
so that ¯¯¯¯
∂ϕ12
∂a11
(a12 | a11, y)
¯¯¯¯
< ²
Z
R
¯¯¯¯
∂gσ1
∂a11
(x1 | a11, y)
¯¯¯¯
dx1 ≤ 2²E[q(x1) | a11,σ21, y].
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Therefore,
1
2²
Z
R
¯¯¯¯
∂ϕ12
∂a11
¯¯¯¯ ¯¯
φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21)
¯¯
dx1
≤
Z
R
E[q(x˜1) | a11, σ21, y˜ = f(x1)] q(x1)φ1(x1 − a11 + σ21) dx1
= E
h
E[q(x˜1) | a11, σ21 , y˜] q(x˜1)
¯¯¯
a11,σ21
i
≤ E
h
E[q(x˜1) | a11, σ21 , y˜]2
¯¯¯
a11,σ21
i1/2
E
£
q(x˜1)
2
¯¯¯
a11,σ21
¤1/2
≤ E
h
E[q(x˜1)
2 | a11,σ21, y˜]
¯¯¯
a11,σ21
i1/2
E
£
q(x˜1)
2
¯¯¯
a11,σ21
¤1/2
= E
£
q(x˜1)
2
¯¯¯
a11,σ21
¤
=
Z
R
¯¯¯¯
φ01(x1)
φ1(x1)
¯¯¯¯2
φ1(x1) dx1 < ²,
where the fourth line follows from Schwartz’ inequality and the fifth line from Jensen’s
inequality. Using the implicit function theorem, we see that the second term on the right-
hand side of (a8) can be evaluated as:
²
Z
R
¯¯¯¯
∂σ12
∂a11
(a11, f(x1))
¯¯¯¯ ¯¯
φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21)
¯¯
dx1
= ²
Z
R
¯¯¯
∂ϕ12
∂a11
(σ12(a11, f(x1)) | a11, y)
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
∂ϕ12
∂a12
(σ12(a11, f(x1)) | a11, y)
¯¯¯ ¯¯φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21)¯¯ dx1
≤ ²κ− ²
Z
R
¯¯¯¯
∂ϕ12
∂a11
(σ12(a11, f(x1)) | a11, f(x1))
¯¯¯¯ ¯¯
φ01(x1 − a11 + σ21)
¯¯
dx1
≤ 2²
3
κ− ²
Hence,
(ϕ11)0(a11) ≤ −κ+
2²3
κ− ² + ² < 0.
This proves the claim. //
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose that σ11 = σ21 . We first show that α2(σ1, f(x1)) =
α2(f(−x1)) for any x1. This would hold trivially if f is even since then f(x1) = f(−x1).
If f is odd, then gσ1 (x1 | y) = gσ1 (−x1 | −y), and hence the symmetry of φ2 implies that
α2(σ1, y) = (c02)−1
³Z
R
φ2(x1) gσ1 (x1 | y) dx1
´
= (c02)
−1
³Z
R
φ2(−x1) gσ1 (−x1 | −y) dx1
´
= α2(σ1,−y).
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It follows that α2(f(−x1)) = α2(σ1,−f(x1)) = α2(σ1, f(x1)). With this equality, σ11 =
σ21 = a∗1 solves (2) sinceZ
R
c2(α2(σ1, f(x1)))φ01(x1) dx1
=
Z ∞
0
c2(α2(σ1, f(x1)))φ01(x1) dx1 +
Z 0
−∞
c2(α2(σ1, f(x1)))φ01(x1) dx1
=
Z ∞
0
c2(α2(σ1, f(x1)))φ01(x1) dx1 −
Z ∞
0
c2(α2(f(−x1)))φ01(x1) dx1
= 0.
This completes the proof. //
Proof of Lemma 7: Fix a2 ∈ R2+ such that a12 = a22. Since h is continuous, the inverse
image h−1({0}) is closed. Furthermore, it is non-empty since (a∗1, a∗1) ∈ h−1({0}) and
bounded since for any aj1 ∈ R+, h(ai1, a
j
1) > 0 for a
i
1 > (c
0
1)
−1(2(φ1∗φ2)(0)) by assumption.
It follows that the continuous function V (·, a2) on the compact set h−1({0}) = {a1 ∈ R2+ :
h(a1) = 0} achieves a maximum. Let a¯1 = (a¯11, a¯21) ∈ h−1({0}) be any maximizer of
V (·, a2) in h−1({0}). We show that a¯1 = (a∗1, a∗1). Suppose that a¯11 > a¯21. Since ∂h∂a21 6= 0
by (4), the implicit function theorem shows that there exists a function γ defined in a
neighborhood of a¯11 such that h(a
1
1, γ(a11)) = 0. Furthermore, γ is differentiable at a¯11 and
the derivative γ0(a¯11) is given by the left-hand side of (4) with a¯i1 replacing ai1. Now let
δ(a11) = V (a11, γ(a11), a2). δ is also differentiable at a¯11 and its derivative is given by
δ0(a¯11) =
∂V
∂a11
(a¯1, a2) +
∂V
∂a21
(a¯1, a2) γ0(a¯11).
It can be readily verified that (5) implies δ0(a11) > 0. This contradicts our assumption that
V is maximized at a¯1 in h
−1({0}) = 0. The symmetric argument shows that it cannot be
maximized at a¯ such that a¯11 > a¯
2
1 either. Hence, we must have a¯
1
1 = a¯
2
1 = a
∗
1. //
Proof of Theorem 8: By Assumption 4, (φ1 ∗ φ2)(a11 − a21) ≤ (φ1 ∗ φ2)(0). It then
follows from (3) that Eσ[α2(σ1, y˜)] ≤ a∗2. By Assumption 3, we have
v(σ, f) = Eσ
£
V
¡
σ1, a12 = a22 = α2(σ1, y˜)
¢¤
= A(σ1)Eσ
£
α2(σ1, y˜)
¤
+B(σ1)
≤ A(σ1) a∗2 +B(σ1)
= V (σ1, a12 = a22 = a∗2).
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Since σ1 solves (2) by assumption, we have by Lemma 7
V
¡
σ1, a∗2, a∗2
¢
≤ V
¡
a∗1, a
∗
1, a
∗
2, a
∗
2
¢
.
Since the right-hand side equals the principal’s expected payoff in the symmetric PBE
under the no-feedback policy, the desired conclusion follows. //
Proof of Theorem 9: We first show that Assumption 5 implies
(a9) P (|ζ˜2| ≥ κ)) = min
δ∈R
P (|ζ˜2 + δ| ≥ κ)) for any κ > 0.
Let δ > 0 and κ > 0 be given. When δ < 2κ, we have
P (|ζ˜2| < κ))− P (|ζ˜2 + δ| < κ))
= −
Z −κ
−κ−δ
φ2(x) dx+
Z κ
κ−δ
φ2(x) dx
> −δ φ2(−κ) + δ φ2(κ)
= 0.
On the other hand, when δ > 2κ, we have
P (|ζ˜2| < κ))− P (|ζ˜2 + δ| < κ))
=
Z κ
−κ
φ2(x) dx−
Z κ−δ
−κ−δ
φ2(x) dx
> 2κφ2(κ)− 2κφ2(κ− δ)
> 0.
The similar argument proves (a9) when δ < 0.
We now show that the expected stage 2 effort implied by σ is less than or equal to
that implied by the symmetric PBE under the full-feedback policy:
(a10) Eσ
£
α2(σ1, y˜)
¤
≤ a∗∗2 ≡
Z
R
(c02)
−1(φ2(x1))φ(x1) dx1.
It would then follow from Lemma 7 and Assumption 2 that
Eσ
h
V
³
σ1, a12 = a22 = α2(σ1, y˜)
´i
≤ Eσ
h
V
³
a∗1, a
∗
1, a
1
2 = a
2
2 = α2(σ1, y˜)
´i
= A(a∗1, a
∗
1)E
σ[α2(σ1, y˜)] +B(a∗1, a∗1)
≤ A(a∗1, a∗1) a∗∗2 +B(a∗1, a∗1).
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Since the far right-hand side equals the principal’s expected payoff in the symmetric PBE
under the full-feedback policy, the desired conclusion would follow.
Note that since Eσ
£
α2(σ1, y˜)
¤
≤ Eσ
£
(c02)
−1(φ2(x˜1))
¤
from the proof of Theorem 5,
(a10) is implied by
(a11) Eσ
£
(c02)
−1(φ2(x˜1))
¤
≤ a∗∗2 .
Let η2 : [0,φ2(0)]→ R+ be the inverse of the restriction of φ2 to R+. In other words, for
each u ∈ [0,φ2(0)], η2(u) ≥ 0 is the unique number such that φ2(η2(u)) = u. Note that η2 is
well-defined under Assumption 5. Given any δ ∈ R, let the function G(· | δ) : [0,φ2(0)]→
R+ be defined by G(u | δ) = 1−Φ2(η2(u)− δ)+Φ2(−η2(u)− δ) = P
¡|ζ2+ δ| ≥ η2(u)¢. It
is easy to verify that G(· | δ) is a distribution function over [0,φ2(0)] since it is increasing,
and satisfies G(0 | δ) = 0 and G(φ2(0) | δ) = 1. If we write δ = a11 − a21 and u = φ2(x1),
then
E
£
(c02)
−1¡φ2(x1)¢ | a1¤
=
Z
R
(c02)
−1¡φ2(x1)¢φ1(x1 − δ) dx1
=
Z φ2(0)
0
(c02)
−1(u)φ1(η2(u)− δ) (−η02(u)) du
+
Z φ2(0)
0
(c02)
−1(u)φ1(−η2(u)− δ) (−η02(u)) du
=
Z φ2(0)
0
(c02)
−1(u) dG(u | δ).
By (a9), G(u | δ) = P ¡|ζ2+ δ| ≥ η2(u)¢ ≥ P ¡|ζ2| ≥ η2(u)¢ = G(u | 0) for any u ∈ [0,φ2(0)]
and δ ∈ R so that G(u | 0) first-order stochastically dominates G(u | δ) with δ 6= 0. Since
(c02)
−1 is increasing, it follows thatZ φ2(0)
0
(c02)
−1(u) dG(u | δ) ≤
Z φ2(0)
0
(c02)
−1(u) dG(u | 0).
Changing variables back to x1, we see that the right-hand side of this inequality equals
a∗∗2 . //
Proof of Theorem 10: The proof consists of three steps. In the first step, we specify
the effort level contingent on each possible history. The second step shows that this effort
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level must be chosen in any symmetric pure PBE. In the third step, it is shown that this
effort level is indeed optimal. Define
κ = min
n
1, 1
7
min
1≤t≤T
inf
at∈R
c00t (at)
o
> 0,
and take ² > 0 such that
max
½
ct
³
(c0t)
−1(²T )
´
, ct
³
(c0t)
−1(−²T )
´¾
< 1 for t = 1, . . . , T ,
² < 2−T κ, and(a12)
² <
1
T
min
1≤t≤T
min
n
lim
a→∞
c0t(a), lim
a→∞
|c0t(−a)|
o
.
Step 1. For each zt−1 ∈ Zt−1(f) and t = 1, . . . , T , define
αt(zt−1) = (c0t)−1
µZ
RT−1
φT (∆T−1)
T−1Y
s=t
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
¶
.
Let gαt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) denote the density of ωt−1 conditional on zt−1 = (y1, . . . , yt−1)
and b1t−1 = (a
1
1, . . . , a
1
t−1), provided that agent 2 chooses αs(zs−1) in stage s = 1, . . . , t− 1:
gαt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) =
Qt−1
s=1 φs(xs − a1s + αs(zs−1))R
Xft−1(zt−1)
Qt−1
s=1 φs(x0s − a1s + αs(zs−1)) dω0t−1
if ωt−1 ∈ Xft−1(zt−1) and gαt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) = 0 otherwise. Note that for any ωt−1 ∈
Xft−1(zt−1) and u = 1, . . . , t− 1,
∂gαt−1
∂a1u
(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1)
= −φ
0
u(xu − a1u + αu(zu−1))
φu(xu − a1u + αu(zu−1))
Qt−1
s=1 φs(xs − a1s + αs(zs−1))R
Xf
t−1(zt−1)
Qt−1
s=1 φs(x0s − a1s + αs(zs−1)) dω0t−1
+
Qt−1
s=1 φs(xs − a1s + αs(zs−1))³R
Xf
t−1(zt−1)
Qt−1
s=1 φs(x0s − a1s + αs(zs−1)) dω0t−1
´2
×
Z
Xft−1(zt−1)
φ0u(x0u − a1u + αu(zu−1))
φu(x0u − a1u + αu(zu−1))
t−1Y
s=1
φs(x0s − a1s + αs(zs−1)) dω0t−1.
Hence, when (**) holds,Z
Xft−1(zt−1)
¯¯¯∂gαt−1
∂a1u
(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1)
¯¯¯
dωt−1
≤ 2
R
Xf
t−1(zt−1)
¯¯¯
φ0u(xu−a
1
u+αu(zu−1))
φu(xu−a1u+αu(zu−1))
¯¯¯ Qt−1
s=1 φs(xs − a1s + αs(zs−1)) dωt−1R
Xft−1(zt−1)
Qt−1
s=1 φs(xs − a1s + αs(zs−1)) dωt−1
(a13)
≤ 2².
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Now for each b1T−1 = (a
1
1, . . . , a
1
T−1), zT−1 ∈ ZT−1(f), and a1T ∈ R, let
ϕ1T (a1T | b1T−1, zT−1) = −c0T (a1T ) +
Z
RT−1
φT
³
a1T − αT (zT−1) +∆T−1
´
× gαT−1(ωT−1 | b1T−1, zT−1) dωT−1.
Note that ϕ1T is continuous in a1T , and that
ϕ1T (−a1T | b1T−1, zT−1) > 0, and ϕ1T (a1T | b1T−1, zT−1) < 0 for a1T large enough
by (a12). Furthermore,
∂ϕ1T
∂a1T
(a1T | b1T−1, zT−1)
= −c00T (a1T ) +
Z
RT−1
φ0T
³
a1T − αT (zT−1) +∆T−1
´
× gαT−1(ωT−1 | b1T−1, zT−1) dωT−1(a14)
≤ −κ+ ² < 0
for any a1T ∈ R. Hence, there exists a unique a1T ∈ R that solves ϕ1T (a1T | b1T−1, zT−1) = 0.
We define σ1T (b1T−1, zT−1) to be this solution. Agent 2’s contingent action σ2T in stage T
is defined in a similar manner: For each b2T−1 = (a
2
1, . . . , a
2
T−1), zT−1 ∈ ZT−1(f), and
a2T ∈ R, let σ2T (b2T−1, zT−1) be the unique solution to ϕ2T (a2T | b2T−1, zT−1) = 0, where
ϕ2T (a2T | b2T−1, zT−1) = −c0T (a2T ) +
Z
RT−1
φT
³
−αT (zT−1) + a2T −∆T−1
´
× gαT−1(ωT−1 | b2T−1, zT−1) dωT−1.
We now show that σiT defined above satisfies (i) and (ii) below.
(i) cT (σiT (biT−1, zT−1)) < 1 and |c0T (σiT (biT−1, zT−1))| < 1 for any (biT−1, zT−1).
(ii) For u = 1, . . . , T − 1, σiT is differentiable as a function of a1u, and¯¯¯∂σiT
∂a1u
(biT−1, zT−1)
¯¯¯
< 1 for any (biT−1, zT−1).
It is clear from the definition of σiT and (**) that |c0T (σiT )| ≤ ² < 1 and hence that
cT (σiT ) ≤ max
n
cT
¡
(c0T )
−1(²)
¢
, cT
¡
(c0T )
−1(−²)
¢o
< 1.
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Since
∂ϕ1T
∂a1
T
(a1T | b1T−1, zT−1) > 0 as noted above, σ1T is differentiable with respect to a1u by
the implicit function theorem, and the derivative is given by
∂σ1T
∂a1u
(b1T−1, zT−1) = −
∂ϕ1T
∂a1u
(σ1T (b1T−1, zT−1) | b1T−1, zT−1)
∂ϕ1
T
∂a1
T
(σ1T (b1T−1, zT−1) | b1T−1, zT−1)
.
Since
∂ϕ1T
∂a1u
(b1T−1, zT−1) =
Z
RT−1
φT (σ1T − αT +∆T−1)
∂gαT−1
∂a1u
(ωT−1 | b1T−1, zT−1) dωT−1,
we have
¯¯¯
∂ϕ1T
∂a1u
¯¯¯
≤ 2²2 by (a13). Hence, it follows from (a14) that
¯¯¯∂σ1T
∂a1u
(b1T−1, zT−1)
¯¯¯
≤ 2²
2
κ− ² < 1.
As an induction hypothesis, fix t < T and suppose that we have defined σiT , . . . ,σit+1
for which (i) and (ii) below hold (s = t+ 1, . . . , T ):
(i) cs(σis(bis−1, zs−1)) < 1 and |c0s(σis(bis−1, zs−1))| < 1 for any (bis−1, zs−1).
(ii) For u = 1, . . . , s− 1, σis(bis−1, zs−1) is differentiable as a function of a1u, and¯¯¯¯
∂σis
∂a1u
(bis−1, zs−1)
¯¯¯¯
< 1 for any (bis−1, zs−1).
Let
(a15) σit+1,t(bit, zt) = σit+1(bit, zt),
and for each s = t+ 2, . . . , T , define σis,t recursively by
(a16) σis,t(bit, zs−1) = σis
³¡
bit,σit+1,t(bit, zt), . . . ,σis−1,t(bit, zs−2)
¢
, zs−1
´
.
The interpretation is that σis,t(bit, zs−1) is agent i’s action in stage s induced by σit+1, . . . , σis
after the sequence of actions bit in stages 1, . . . , t and announcements zs−1 after stages
1, . . . , s− 1. It can be verified that for any u ≤ t < s,
∂σis,t
∂aiu
=
s−t−1X
k=0
X
t<τ1<···<τk<s
∂σis
∂aiτk
∂σiτk
∂aiτk−1
· · · · · ∂σ
i
τ2
∂aiτ1
∂σiτ1
∂aiu
.
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We now define σ1t as follows. For b1t−1 = (a11, . . . , a1t−1), zt−1 ∈ Zt−1(f), and a1t ∈ R, let
ϕ1t (a1t | bt−1, zt−1) = −c0t(a1t )
+
Z
RT−1
½
ΦT
³
σ1T,t((b1t−1, a1t ), zT−1)− αT (zT−1) +∆T−1
´
−
TX
s=t+1
cs
³
σ1s,t
¡
(b1t−1, a
1
t ), zs−1
¢´¾
× φ0t
¡
xt − a1t + αt(zt−1)
¢ T−1Y
s=t+1
φs
³
xs − σ1s,t
¡
(b1t−1, a
1
t ), zs−1
¢
+ αs(zs−1)
´
(a17)
× gαt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) dωT−1,
where zs−1 = (zt−1, ft(ωt), . . . , fs−1(ws−1)) for s = t+ 1, . . . , T . By the induction hypoth-
esis, ϕ1t is differentiable in a1t , and the derivative is given by
∂ϕ1t
∂a1t
(a1t | b1t−1, zt−1)
= −c00t (a1t ) +
Z
RT−1
n
φT
¡
σ1T,t − αT +∆T−1
¢ ∂σ1T,t
∂a1t
−
TX
s=t+1
c0s(σ1s,t)
∂σ1s,t
∂a1t
o
× φ
0
t(xt − a1t + σ2t )
φt(xt − a1t + αt)
T−1Y
s=t
φs(xs − σ1s,t + αs) gαt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) dωT−1
−
Z
RT−1
n
ΦT
¡
σ1T,t − αT +∆T−1
¢
−
TX
s=t+1
cs(σ1s,t)
o
×
½
φ00t (xt − a1t + αt) + φ0t(xt − a1t + αt)
T−1X
k=t+1
φ0k(xk − σ1k,t + αk)
φk(xk − σ1k,t + αk)
∂σk,t
∂a1t
¾
×
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs − σ1s,t + αs) gαt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) dωT−1.
Note first that by the induction hypothesis,¯¯¯∂σis,t
∂ait
¯¯¯
=
s−t−1X
k=0
X
t<τ1<···<τk<s
¯¯¯ ∂σis
∂aiτk
¯¯¯ ¯¯¯ ∂σiτk
∂aiτk−1
¯¯¯
· · · · ·
¯¯¯∂σiτ2
∂aiτ1
¯¯¯ ¯¯¯∂σiτ1
∂ait
¯¯¯
<
s−t−1X
k=0
X
t<τ1<···<τk<s
1(a18)
=
s−t−1X
k=0
µ
s− t− 1
k
¶
= 2s−t−1
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Hence, we can evaluate
∂ϕ1t
∂a1t
using (a12) as:
∂ϕ1t
∂a1t
(a1t | b1t−1, zt−1)
≤ −c00t (a1t ) + ²{²2T−t−1 +
TX
s=t+1
2s−t−1}+ ²{1+ T − t}{1+ ²
T−1X
s=t+1
2k−t−1}
= −c00t (a1t ) + ²(²2T−t−1 + 2T−t − 1) + ²(1+ T − t)(1+ ²2T−t−1 − ²)
≤ −c00t (a1t ) + ²(κ+ 2T−t − 1) + κ(1+ κ)
≤ −c00t (a1t ) + 3κ < 0.
This, along with the fact that
ϕ1t (−a1t | b1t−1, zt−1) > 0 and ϕ1t (a1t | b1t−1, zt−1) < 0 for a1t large enough,
implies that there exists a unique a1t for which ϕ1t (a1t | b1t−1, zt−1) = 0. Define σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1)
to be this solution.
For agent 2, for each b2t−1 = (a
2
1, . . . , a
2
t−1), and zt−1 ∈ Zt−1(f), let σ2t (b2t−1, zt−1) be
the unique solution to ϕ2t (a2t | b2t−1, zt−1) = 0, where
ϕ2t (a2t | b2t−1, zt−1) = −c0t(a2t )
+
Z
RT−1
½
−ΦT
³
αT (zT−1) + a2t −∆T−1
´
−
TX
s=t+1
cs
³
σ2s,t((b2t−1, a2t ), zs−1)
´¾
× φ0t
¡
xt − αt(zt−1) + a2t
¢ T−1Y
s=t+1
φs
¡
xs − αs(zs−1) + σ2s,t((b2t−1, a2t ), zs−1)
¢
(a19)
× gαt−1(ωt−1 | b2t−1, zt−1) dωT−1.
To see that σ1t satisfies (i), note that (a17) and (**) together imply¯¯¯
c0t
¡
σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1)
¢¯¯¯
≤ ² (1+ T − t) ≤ ²T < 1.
This further implies that (c0t)−1(−²T ) < σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1) < (c0t)−1(²T ). Hence,
ct
¡
σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1)
¢
< max
n
ct
³
(c0t)
−1(−²T )
´
, ct
³
(c0t)
−1(²T )
´o
< 1.
For (ii), since
∂ϕ1t
∂a1t
(a1t | b1t−1, zt−1) < 0, σ1t is differentiable as a function of a1u (u =
1, . . . , t − 1) by the implicit function theorem. Furthermore, differentiation of ϕ1t with
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respect to a1u yields
∂ϕ1t
∂a1u
(a1t | b1t−1, zt−1)
=
Z
RT−1
n
φT (σ1T,t − αT +∆T−1)
∂σ1T,t
∂a1u
−
TX
s=t+1
c0s(σ1s,t)
∂σ1s,t
∂a1u
o
× φ0t(xt − a1t + αt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs − σ1s,t + αs) gαt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) dωT−1
+
Z
RT−1
n
ΦT (σ1T,t − αT +∆T−1)−
TX
s=t+1
cs(σ1s,t)
o
×
½∂gαt−1
∂a1u
(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1)− gαt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1)
T−1X
k=t+1
φ0k(xk − σ1k,t + αk)
φk(xk − σ1k,t + αk)
∂σ1k,t
∂a1u
¾
× φ0t(xt − a1t + αt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs − σ1s,t + αs) dωT−1.
By (**), (a12), (a13), (a18), and the induction hypothesis, ∂ϕ
1
t
∂a1u
can be evaluated as:¯¯¯¯
∂ϕ1t
∂a1u
(a1t | b1t−1, zt−1)
¯¯¯¯
≤ {²2T−t−1 +
TX
s=t+1
2s−t−1}²+ (1+ T − t)²2
T−1X
k=t+1
2k−t−1 + 2²(1+ T − t)²T−t
= ²(²2T−t−1 + 2T−t − 1) + ²2(1+ T − t)(2T−t−1 − 1) + 2²(1+ T − t)
≤ ²(κ+ 2T−t − 1) + κ²2T−t−1 + 2κ
≤ κ+ κ2 + 2κ
≤ 4κ.
Therefore, the derivative
∂σ1t
∂a1u
satisfies
¯¯¯¯
∂σ1t
∂a1u
(b1t−1, zt−1)
¯¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯
∂ϕ1t
∂a1u
(σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1) | b1t−1, zt−1)
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
∂ϕ1t
∂a1t
(σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1) | b1t−1, zt−1)
¯¯¯ < 4κ
c00t (a1t )− 3κ
≤ 1.
This advances the induction step and the desired conclusion follows.
Step 2. We now show that the effort choice ait = σit(bit−1, zt−1) in any symmetric PBE σ
must satisfy ϕit(ait | bit−1, zt−1) = 0 for any (bit−1, zt−1) and t.
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Fix any symmetric PBE σ and recall that πit(ait | σ, bit−1, zt−1) denotes agent i’s payoff
over stages t, . . . , T when (i) i’s history in stages 1, . . . , t − 1 equals hit−1 = (bit−1, zt−1),
(ii) i takes action ait in stage t and plays according to σis in stages s = t+ 1, . . . , T (given
hit−1 and a
i
t), and (iii) j plays according to σjs in every stage s. Write πit(ait | bit−1, zt−1) =
πit(ait | σ, bit−1, zt−1) for simplicity. Recall also that gσt−1(ωt−1 | bit−1, zt−1) is defined as
the density of ωt−1 conditional on i’s history (bit−1, zt−1) provided that agent j played
according to σjs in stage s = 1, . . . , t− 1. For agent 1, π1t (a1t | b1t−1, zt−1) can be expressed
as
π1t (a1t | b1t−1, zt−1)
= −ct(a1t )
+
Z
RT−1
½
P
³
ζ˜T + σ1T,t(b1t−1, a1t , zT−1)− σ2T,0(zT−1) > −∆T−1
´
−
TX
s=t+1
cs(σ1s,t(b1t−1, a1t , zs−1))
¾
(a20)
× φt
³
xt − a1t + σ2t,0(zt−1)
´
×
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs
³
xs − σ1s,t(b1t−1, a1t , zs−1) + σ2s,0(zs−1)
´
× gσt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) dωT−1,
where zs =
¡
zt−1, ft(ωt), . . . , fs(ωs)
¢
for s = t, . . . , T − 1. Suppose first that t = T . In this
case, π1T can be expressed as
π1T (a1T | b1T−1, zT−1)
= −cT (a1T ) +
Z
RT−1
ΦT
³
a1T − σ2T,0(zT−1) +∆T−1
´
gσT−1(ωT−1 | b1T−1, zT−1) dωT−1.
Differentiating π1T with respect to a1T , we obtain
∂π1T
∂a1T
(a1T | b1T−1, zT−1)
= −c0T (a1T ) +
Z
RT−1
φT
³
a1T − σ2T,0(zT−1) +∆T−1
´
gσT−1(ωT−1 | b1T−1, zT−1) dωT−1.
Sequential rationality of σ1T implies
c0T (σ1T (b1T−1, zT−1)) =
Z
RT−1
φT
³
σ1T (b1T−1, zT−1)− σ2T,0(zT−1) +∆T−1
´
(a21)
× gσT−1(ωT−1 | b1T−1, zT−1) dωT−1.
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The corresponding FOC for agent 2 is given by
c0T (σ2T (b2T−1, zT−1)) =
Z
RT−1
φT
³
−σ1T,0(zT−1) + σ2T (b2T−1, zT−1)−∆T−1
´
(a22)
× gσT−1(ωT−1 | b2T−1, zT−1) dωT−1.
When biT−1 equals the action sequence induced by σi along zT−1, we have σiT (biT−1, zT−1) =
σiT,0(zT−1) and gσT−1(ωT−1 | biT−1, zT−1) = gT−1(ωT−1 | zT−1) by definition so that (a21)
and (a22) imply that the stage T effort on the equilibrium path should satisfy
(a23) σ1T,0(zT−1) = σ2T,0(zT−1) = (c0T )−1
³
Eσ
£
φT (∆˜T−1) | zT−1
¤´
= αT (zT−1).
It follows from (a23) that (a17) and (a19) are equivalent to ϕ1T (a1T | b1T−1, zT−1) = 0 and
ϕ2T (a2T | b2T−1, zT−1) = 0, respectively.
As an induction hypothesis, fix t < T and suppose that the FOC for agent i’s payoff
maximization in stage s is given by ϕis(ais | bis−1, zs−1) = 0 (s = t + 1, . . . , T ). By Step
1, σis,t (s = t+ 1, . . . , T ) (defined in (a15) and (a16)) is differentiable as a function of a1t ,
and hence so is π1t (· | b1t−1, zt−1). Using the envelope theorem, we can differentiate (a20)
to obtain
∂π1t
∂a1t
(a1t | b1t−1, zt−1)
= −c0t(a1t )
−
Z
RT−1
½
ΦT,t
³
σ1T,t(b1t−1, a1t , zT−1)− σ2T,0(zT−1)−∆T−1
´
−
TX
s=t+1
cs
³
σ1s,t(b1t−1, a1t , zs−1)
´¾
× φ0t
³
xt − a1t + σ2t,0(zt−1)
´ T−1Y
s=t+1
φs
³
xs − σ1s,t(b1t−1, a1t , zs−1) + σ2s,0(zs−1)
´
× gσt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) dωT−1.
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Sequential rationality of σ1t implies
c0t(σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1)) = −
Z
RT−1
½
ΦT
³
σ1T,t−1(b1t−1, zT−1)− σ2T,0(zT−1) +∆T−1
´
−
TX
s=t+1
cs
³
σ1s,t−1(b1t−1, zs−1)
´¾
× φ0t
³
xt − σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1) + σ2t,0(zt−1)
´
(a24)
×
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs
³
xs − σ1s,t−1(b1t−1, zs−1) + σ2s,0(zs−1)
´
× gσt−1(ωt−1 | b1t−1, zt−1) dωT−1.
The corresponding FOC for agent 2 is given by
c0t(σ1t (b1t−1, zt−1)) = −
Z
RT−1
½
ΦT
³
−σ1T,0(zT−1) + σ2T,t−1(b2t−1, zT−1)−∆T−1
´
−
TX
s=t+1
cs
³
σ2s,t−1(b2t−1, zs−1)
´¾
× φ0t
³
xt − σ1t,0(zt−1) + σ2t (b2t−1, zt−1)
´
(a25)
×
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs
³
xs − σ1s,0(zs−1) + σ2s,t−1(b2t−1, zs−1)
´
× gσt−1(ωt−1 | b2t−1, zt−1) dωT−1.
When b1t−1 equals the action sequence induced by σ1 along zt−1, σ1s,t−1(b1t−1, z1s−1) =
σ1s,0(zs−1) (s = t, . . . , T ). Substituting this and the symmetry condition σ1s,0(zs−1) =
σ2s,0(zs−1) for each s into (a23), we obtain
c0t(σ1t,0(zt−1))
= −
Z
RT−1
ΦT (∆T−1)φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
+
Z
RT−1
TX
s=t
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1(a26)
= Eσ
h
φT (∆˜T−1) | zt−1
i
+
Z
RT−1
TX
s=t+1
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1,
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where the second equality follows from integration by parts over xt. When the feedback
policy f is even, we have
(a27)
Z
RT−1
TX
s=t+1
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1 = 0.
To see this, for each subset J of {2, . . . , T − 1}, let
B(J) =
©
ωT−1 ∈ RT−1 : x1 > 0, xs > 0 if s ∈ J and xs < 0 if s /∈ J
ª
.
For example, B(J) = R+× (−RT−2+ ) for J = φ and B(J) = RT−1+ for J = {2, . . . , T − 1}.
It can be seen that for each J ⊂ {2, . . . , T − 1},Z
B(J)
TX
s=t+1
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
+
Z
−B(J)
TX
s=t+1
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
=
Z
B(J)
TX
s=t+1
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
−
Z
−B(J)
TX
s=t+1
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(−xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(−xs) gσt−1(−ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
=
Z
B(J)
TX
s=t+1
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
−
Z
B(J)
TX
s=t+1
cs
¡
σ1s,0(zs−1)
¢
φ0t(xt)
T−1Y
s=t+1
φs(xs) gt−1(ωt−1 | zt−1) dωT−1
= 0,
where the first equality uses φs(xs) = φs(−xs) and φ0t(xt) = −φ0t(−xt), and the sec-
ond uses the change of variables and the fact that zs−1 = (f1(ω1), . . . , fs−1(ωs−1)) =
(f1(−ω1), . . . , fs−1(−ωs−1)). (a27) follows if we noteZ
RT−1
=
X
J⊂{2,...,T−1}
nZ
B(J)
+
Z
−B(J)
o
.
From (a26) and (a27), we see that the stage t effort on the symmetric equilibrium path
should satisfy
(a28) σ1t,0(zt−1) = σ2t,0(zt−1) = (c0t)−1
³
Eσ
h
φT (∆˜T−1) | zt−1
i´
= αt(zt−1).
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(a28) shows that (a24) and (a25) are equivalent to ϕ1t (a1t | b1t−1, zt−1) = 0 and ϕ2t (a2t |
b2t−1, zt−1) = 0, respectively.
Step 3. Finally, we show that the effort choice defined by ϕit(ait | bit−1, zt−1) = 0 maximizes
each agent’s payoff. For this, it suffices to verify that we have from Steps 1 and 2,
∂2πit
∂(ait)
2 (a
i
t | bit−1, zt−1) =
∂ϕit
∂ait
(ait | bit−1, zt−1) < 0
for any ait and t. //
Proof of Theorem 12: Let σ be the symmetric pure PBE under f specified in (7). By
the symmetry of σ, we have
Pσ(∆˜t−1 = yt−1 | zt−1) = Pσ(∆˜t−1 = −yt−1 | zt−1) = 1
2
.
It hence follows from (7) that
c0t(σit(zt−1))
=
Z
RT−t
n1
2
φT
³
yt−1 +
T−1X
s=t
xs
´
+
1
2
φT
³
−yt−1 +
T−1X
s=t
xs
´o T−1Y
s=t
φs(xs) dxt · · · dxT−1
=
1
2
(φt ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(−yt−1) + 1
2
(φt ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(yt−1)
= (φt ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(yt−1).
Therefore,
σit(zt−1) = (c0t)−1
¡
(φt ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(yt−1)
¢
.
Now take any symmetric pure PBE σ0 under any alternative feedback policy f 0. Denote
y0t = f
0
t(x1, . . . , xt) and z
0
t = (y
0
1, . . . , y
0
t). Since (c
0
t)
−1 is concave, Jensen’s inequality
implies that
Eσ
0£
(σ0)it(z˜0t−1)
¤
= Eσ
0
·
(c0t)
−1
³
Eσ
0h
φT (∆˜T−1)
¯¯¯
z˜0t−1
i´¸
= Eσ
0
·
(c0t)
−1
µ
Eσ
0h
Eσ
0£
φT (∆˜T−1) | ω˜t−1
¤ ¯¯¯
z˜0t−1
i¶¸
≤ Eσ
0
·
Eσ
0h
(c0t)
−1
³
Eσ
0£
φT (∆˜T−1) | ω˜t−1
¤´ ¯¯¯
z˜0t−1
i¸
= Eσ
0h
(c0t)
−1
³
Eσ
0£
φT (∆˜T−1) | ω˜t−1
¤´i
.
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On the other hand,
Eσ
0h
φT (∆˜T−1)
¯¯¯
ωt−1
i
=
Z
RT−t
φT (∆t−1 +
T−1X
s=t
xs)
T−1Y
s=t
φs(xs) dxt · · · dxT−1
= (φt ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(∆t−1).
Substituting this into the above, we obtain
Eσ
0£
(σ0)it(z˜0t−1)
¤
≤ Eσ
0h
(c0t)
−1
³
(φt ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(∆˜t−1)
´i
=
Z
Rt−1
(c0t)
−1
³
(φt ∗ · · · ∗ φT )(|∆t−1|)
´ t−1Y
s=1
φs(xs) dωt−1
= Eσ
£
σit(z˜t−1)
¤
.
We hence obtain the desired conclusion. //
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